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Abstract The recent years have seen the birth of several
NoSQL datastores, which are getting more and more
popularity for their ability to handle high volumes of
heterogeneous and unstructured data in a very efficient
way. In several cases, NoSQL databases proved to outclass
in terms of performance, scalability, and ease of use rela-
tional database management systems, meeting the
requirements of a variety of today ICT applications.
However, recent surveys reveal that, despite their
undoubted popularity, NoSQL datastores suffer from some
weaknesses, among which the lack of effective support for
data protection appears among the most serious ones.
Proper data protection mechanisms are therefore required
to fill this void. In this work, we start to address this issue
by focusing on access control and discussing the definition
of a fine-grained access control framework for document-
oriented NoSQL datastores. More precisely, we first focus
on issues and challenges related to the definition of such a
framework, considering theoretical, implementation, and
integration aspects. Then, we discuss the reasons for which
state-of-the-art fine-grained access control solutions pro-
posed for relational database management systems cannot
be used within the NoSQL scenario. We then introduce
possible strategies to address the identified issues, which
are at the basis of the framework development. Finally, we
shortly report the outcome of an experience where the
proposed framework has been used to enhance the data
protection features of a popular NoSQL database.
Keywords Fine-grained access control  Document stores 
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1 Introduction
NoSQL datastores are getting popularity in a variety of
scenarios, and their diffusion is growing especially within
the data management back-end of modern web applica-
tions, and the data storage and analysis layer of Internet of
Things platforms. The reasons of NoSQL datastores dif-
fusion range from outstanding performance and scalability,
to the provided support for handling high volumes of data,
as well as to the ease of interaction with external appli-
cations. As a matter of fact, NoSQL datastores outperform
relational database management systems (RDBMSs) with
respect to the efficiency of data analysis, the flexibility, and
the scalability of data management. Current surveys1 show
that MongoDB,2 which is the current most popular NoSQL
datastore, immediately follows, in terms of diffusion,
widely used RDBMSs, such as Oracle Database3 or
MySQL.4 This shows that NoSQL datastores are affirmed
solutions which compete in terms of diffusion with
RDBMSs.
Different from RDBMSs, characterized by a standard
reference data model and query language, a variety of
proprietary query languages have been proposed for
NoSQL datastores, as well as different data models have
been introduced for them. Recent surveys have classified
NoSQL databases into three main categories on the basis of
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the adopted data model, namely key value, wide column,
and document-oriented datastores [7]. Each of these classes
is characterized by features that make the related datastores
suited to specific application scenarios. Key-value datas-
tores (e.g., Redis)5 handle data modeled as pairs of keys
and values. Data can be of primitive type or complex
objects and are uniquely identified by a key. Such systems
allow executing basic queries which retrieve values cor-
responding to given keys. They are very efficient in terms
of used computational resources. Wide column stores (e.g.,
Cassandra)6 are an evolution of key-value datastores, with
more advanced data organization and analysis features.
Data are collected into flexible tables, and they are mod-
eled as heterogeneous records of variable size. Tables are
flexible in that each row can be composed of a different set
of columns, and columns, in turn, can be organized into
column families. Finally, document-oriented datastores
(e.g., MongoDB) model data as heterogeneous, hierarchical
records, denoted as documents, which in turn are composed
of sets of key-value pairs, each specifying a document
field. Documents are grouped into collections, which in
turn compose a database. Document-oriented datastores
provide complex data management and analysis features
and query languages and appear as the most flexible and
complex currently available NoSQL datastores.
Even though the advanced data analysis and manage-
ment features of NoSQL datastores are making them very
popular, these platforms show several shortcomings, and,
as highlighted in [18], one of the most serious is related to
the poor data protection mechanisms they currently offer.
For instance, Okman et al. [18] analyze the basic authen-
tication and authorization features of MongoDB and Cas-
sandra and propose possible strategies to enhance them.
In this work, we focus on access control features of
NoSQL datastores, since access control is the core data
protection module of any DBMS. Most of NoSQL systems
adopt basic access control mechanisms operating at coarse-
grained level. For instance, within document-oriented
datastores, access control is enforced at the level of data-
base or at the level of collection of documents. Even
MongoDB, the most popular NoSQL datastore, integrates a
role-based access control model operating at collection
level only. While collection level protection is a good step
forward with respect to several other systems operating at
database level, it is still not sufficient to provide cus-
tomized data protection levels, which could further raise
the usability and diffusion of these systems.
It is well recognized that data management systems that
handle sensitive data could greatly benefit from the inte-
gration of fine-grained access control (FGAC) features.
FGAC has been recognized as a fundamental requirement
in a variety of application scenarios, which range from data
management and analysis systems (e.g., [8, 9, 22]), to
social networks (e.g., [3, 5, 14]), and service oriented and
mobile applications (e.g., [14]). Few NoSQL datastores
provide a native support for FGAC, such as the key-value
datastore Accumulo,7 which enforces access control at cell
level. However, the great majority of the existing systems
do not enforce FGAC, and in this work, we aim at starting
to fill this void.
Recent surveys on database popularity1 rank document-
oriented NoSQL datastores in the top position. This is
probably due to the flexibility of these systems, the pro-
vided advanced analysis features, and the native support for
the management of JSON8 data, which, at present, is
among the most common data exchange format of modern
applications. For these reasons, in this work, we target
document-oriented datastores. Unfortunately, as we will
discuss throughout the paper, the schemaless data model of
document-oriented datastores do not allow to straightfor-
wardly reuse the FGAC enforcement mechanisms defined
for RDBMSs. Moreover, so far no standard NoSQL query
language has emerged yet (neither in general nor for a
specific datastore category), and each datastore adopts a
different language. This reduces the interoperability among
the existing systems, for instance, up to now, it is not
possible to write a query, even of basic type, which can be
executed within several systems. Similarly, data portability
can be problematic. For instance, even though within
MongoDB and Counchbase9 data are serialized as JSON
objects, the importing of a MongoDB dataset into Couch-
base requires preliminary data manipulation activities. The
heterogeneity of NoSQL systems as well as of their query
languages make the definition of a general FGAC
enforcement solution a complex and ambitious task.
In this paper, we survey issues and challenges related to
the development of FGAC enforcement monitors and their
integration into document-oriented NoSQL datastores. The
analysis of the literature lead us to identify possible
strategies to address issues related to the definition of
policy specification criteria, enforcement strategies, the
implementation of the proposed mechanisms by an
enforcement monitor, and aspects related to integration of
the monitor into existing document-oriented datastores.
The analysis described in this paper is partially based on
early research experiences on NoSQL datastores that we
did with MongoDB [10, 12], as well as on ongoing research
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 surveys related work. Section 3 describes the
main issues related to the definition of a FGAC framework
for document-oriented datastores. Section 4 discusses
FGAC enforcement strategies, describing possible ways to
address the previously identified issues. Section 5 shortly
presents an application that shows how the proposed
strategies can be actually applied for the enhancement of
the access control features of MongoDB with FGAC.
Finally, in Sect. 6, we conclude the paper shortly
describing the state of our current research on access
control within NoSQL systems, as well as introducing
future research goals.
2 Related Work
FGAC has been integrated into several relational access
control models, such as, for instance, the purpose-based
model proposed in [6], and the action aware access control
model in [9]. It has been also successfully deployed into
some commercial RDBMSs (e.g., Oracle Virtual Private
Database),10 as well as in modern non-relational systems
(e.g., Accumulo7).
Oracle Virtual Private Database (VPD) [4] is among the
most known fine-grained access control framework for
relational database management systems. Oracle VPD
regulates the access to table rows by means of access
control policies, which specify content- and context-based
predicates that refer to properties of the protected data and
the execution environment. Policy enforcement is achieved
by means of query rewriting, appending the specified pol-
icy predicates to the where clause of the submitted SQL
query. In [20], the enforcement approach used by Oracle
VPD has been classified as a Truman model, where each
data analyst has a partial view of the database. Rizvi et al.
[20] claim that the user view may be inconsistent with
respect to the information included in the database and
propose an enforcement mechanism which only authorizes
the execution of queries whose rewritten version do not
bring to inconsistent views. Other approaches for RDBMSs
enforce access control at a finer granularity level. For
instance, LeFevre et al. [17] propose a SQL-based query
rewriting approach which allows enforcing FGAC by
means of dynamically generated authorized views of
database tables. In [17], access control is enforced at cell
level, generating views where all unauthorized cells are
nullified. Agrawal et al. [1] describe an approach to
transform RDBMSs into privacy-aware DBMSs, which
relies on a language that supports the specification of grant
commands at cell level.
Research efforts have also been recently focused on the
integration of FGAC into NoSQL datastores (e.g.,
[10, 12, 16]) and map-reduce analytics platforms (e.g.,
[22]). For instance, Kulkarni [16] has proposed a fine-
grained access control model for key-value systems deno-
ted K-VAC, which has been first designed to operate with
Cassandra,11 and then extended for the integration into
HBase.12 However, the proposed solution is an ad hoc
implementation and cannot be easily ported or adapted to
other systems.
In [10], we have proposed the integration of a purpose-
based model operating at document level into MongoDB.
The successful experience brought us to refine the granu-
larity and generalize the supported policies. Thus, in [12],
we have proposed an access control model operating at
field level which supports content- and context-based
access control policies similar to those of Oracle VPD.
In [22], we have considered the enforcement of FGAC
policies within map-reduce systems. The pairs key-value
extracted from an accessed resource by a map-reduce job
are dynamically modified on the basis of the specified
FGAC policies, before the mapping phase starts the
processing.
Overall, the research on the integration of FGAC into
NoSQL datastores is still in the early stages. More
specifically, for what document-oriented datastores are
concerned, although the initial experiences that we had
with MongoDB allowed us to identify some approaches to
the definition and integration of FGAC into NoSQL sys-
tems, the proposed solutions need to be generalized to
increase their applicability.
3 FGAC Within NoSQL Document-Oriented
Datastores: Issues and Challenges
As briefly introduced in Sect. 1, the goal of this paper is to
discuss how FGAC can be deployed within document-
oriented NoSQL datastores. Although the goal is similar to
the one already addressed within traditional DBMSs,
intrinsic characteristics of the NoSQL scenario make this a
challenge for data security researchers. Table 1 summarizes
the main reasons for which we believe that the enhance-
ment of document-oriented datastores with FGAC features
is a far more complex and challenging tasks than designing
a FGAC framework for RDBMSs.
In the remainder of this section, we shortly consider
each of these points.
Generality A first aspect that should be taken into con-
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datastores and the need to define a general solution rather
than an ad hoc solution operating with a unique NoSQL
database (e.g., [10]). The complexity of the problem is
partially due to the lack of a standard query language.
Indeed, the enforcement approaches defined for RDBMSs
rely on the presence of the relational model and SQL as
unique data model and query language. In contrast, the
variety of NoSQL datastores that have been defined so far,
most of which operating with a different query language,
make the definition of a general approach a very ambitious
task. In addition, the lack of a reference standard has
caused the definition of multiple implementations of the
document-oriented data model, which differ for data
organization features and terminology. For instance, some
document stores do not integrate the concept of collection
(e.g., CouchDB).13
FGAC granularity Let us now start to consider why the
FGAC solutions developed for RDBMSs cannot be reused
for the NoSQL scenario. To make the discussion more
concrete, let us consider Oracle VPD, one of the most
popular FGAC solutions developed for RDBMSs. Oracle
VPD considers table rows as the finest protection objects.
From a data management perspective, table rows of rela-
tional databases correspond to documents of document-
oriented NoSQL datastores, even though documents model
data resources in a less abstract way than rows, as they do
not abstract from the intrinsic structure of a resource, and
thus they do not require one to flatten the resource content.
Example 1 Let us consider a dataset of emails. An email
has a structure providing meta information related to the
message content. For instance, it includes a header and a
body, where the header is in turn characterized by prop-
erties specifying, among others, the email sender, all the
receivers, and the email subject. Within a document store,
emails can be straightforwardly modeled as a document
whose fields are hierarchically organized to match the
email structure. In contrast, the modeling of the same
dataset with the relational model requires to flatten the
structure of an email by removing fields hierarchy.
At a first sight, due to the parallelism of concepts
between the relational and document-oriented data model,
fine-grained enforcement mechanisms operating at docu-
ment level could be defined starting from the mechanisms
proposed for RDBMSs. However, additional important
aspects need to be considered. To be more concrete, let us
consider again Oracle VPD. Within Oracle VPD, the key
element of an access control policy is a boolean expression
specified over table attributes and contextual properties.
For instance, referring to the application scenario in
Example 1, an access control policy could grant the access
only to those emails that have been sent to a specific email
address. Within the relational model the fields to, cc, and
bcc are attributes of the email table scheme. In contrast, the
schemaless data model of document-oriented NoSQL
datastores brings to the definition of documents that
include these fields only when the modeled email specify a
receiver of that type, as for instance, an email may not have
a bcc receiver or a cc receiver. As a consequence, a con-
tent-based policy could refer to fields which may not be
included in all the documents. This implies the need to
specify content-based access control policies under a dif-
ferent perspective, that is, not only considering fields val-
ues, but also even considering the structural characteristics
of a document, such as the presence of a field.
Table 1 Aspects affecting the complexity of FGAC solutions for data management systems
Aspect Relational DBMSs Document-oriented NoSQL datastores
Generality Eased by a reference data model Multiple declinations of the same data model
Eased by a reference standard query language Multiple proprietary query languages
FGAC
granularity
Access control granularity up to cell level Field level granularity is often a must due to data modeling choices
Cell level policy specification based on a priori
known tables schema
No a priori assumption on documents structure for specification purposes
Cell level enforcement mechanisms based on a
priory known tables schema
No a priori assumption on documents structure for enforcement purposes
Performance Efficiency is important, but no very strict
constraint, due to the size of traditional
datasets
Efficiency is a must due to the high volumes of data. A proper trade-off
between performance and security is needed, taking into consideration that




Query rewriting to enforce access control at row
and cell level
Techniques in the literature not applicable at field level, due to the
schemaless nature of documents
Native support for views No systematic support for views
13 http://www.couchdb.apache.org.
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For what access control granularity is concerned, it is
worth noting that depending on the application context and
the adopted modeling choices, document level granularity
may be too coarse grained. As above mentioned, the
hierarchical structure supported by the document-oriented
data model allows representing data without abstracting
from their structural characteristics. This brings one to
define documents with a potential complex structure and
many fields, and, as a consequence, access control policies
can be defined to protect the access to a single field of a
complex document with a hierarchical structure.
Example 2 Let us consider the application scenario
introduced in Example 1, and an access control policy that
regulates the access to field from of an email.14 Let us
suppose that a query that aims at accessing such an email is
submitted for execution, and the access control policy that
regulates the access to from is not satisfied. An access
control framework similar to Oracle VPD cannot prevent
the access to a single unauthorized sender field. In contrast,
it would prevent the access to the whole document con-
taining such a field. Such a mechanism is too restrictive as
all other fields of the considered document could be freely
accessed.
Within relational databases, the limits of row level
access control brought researchers to define cell level
access control mechanisms. For instance, Lefevre et al.
[17] proposed to enforce cell level access control policies
by means of query rewriting. The idea of the proposed
mechanism is that a query q submitted for execution is
rewritten as q0, in such a way that q0 integrates a subquery
that derives an authorized view of each table t accessed by
q and performs the analysis tasks of q on such a view. The
subquery either projects or nullifies the value of cells on the
basis of the satisfaction of the policies specified for them
[17]. This technique requires to know in advance the
scheme of the accessed data, as well as the name of the
attributes that should be projected. In contrast, the
schemaless nature of NoSQL datastores prevents the sys-
tematic use of similar techniques, as each document in a
collection can be characterized by a different set of fields.
Example 3 Let us suppose to specify an access control
policy which prevents the access to the fifth bcc receiver of
an email when a given condition is not satisfied. The policy
is applied to a single email, whose structure is potentially
different from all other documents of the collection as it
may be the only email with 5 bcc receivers. According to
the approach in [17], one should know in advance the
existence of an email with 5 bcc receivers within the
dataset, in order to rewrite the query.
On the basis of the above-mentioned considerations, we
believe that the heterogeneity of the documents collected
within a NoSQL database makes the definition of a field
level access control mechanism a challenging problem.
Performance An additional challenging aspect is related
to the strict performance requirements that commonly
characterize NoSQL systems, as the access control
enforcement overhead should not compromise the effi-
ciency of the considered systems. Indeed, NoSQL systems
are often used in the back-end of applications where per-
formance and scalability are first class requirements. We
believe that reasonable trade-offs among security, perfor-
mance, and scalability of the proposed enforcement
mechanisms need to be identified, as secure systems with
poor performance may suffer from low usability, but the
same applies to highly efficient insecure databases.
Enforcement mechanisms The literature presents two
main categories of enforcement approaches for FGAC,
namely view-based and query rewriting mechanisms. The
view-based mechanism consists in deriving authorized
views of a resource, on the basis of the specified access
control policies, and granting the permit to access that
views instead of the original data resources. This approach
suffers from several drawbacks. Indeed, different from
relational databases, views are not supported by all NoSQL
datastores, and thus ad hoc implementations are required
within several NoSQL datastores.
The most straightforward solution probably consists in
defining views as temporary collections, which store copies
of authorized documents. Although this naive approach
allows satisfying security requirements, from the engi-
neering perspective the generation and storage of multiple
views of the same resource appears quite impractical, both
in terms of memory and time required for view generation
and serialization. This naive approach suffers from low
efficiency, large memory usage, difficulties to handle
resource updates, and it is not scalable. On the other hand,
disk view serialization may not be a practical solution due
to the variety of views of the protected resources that must
be generated and to the time required for write operations.
Indeed, write on disk operations typically suffer from high
latency, and the definition of multiple views of the same
collection may not be possible for the collection size. In
addition, even assuming that this naive approach can be
used in some application scenarios, this solution requires to
regenerate all views every time the protected resource is
updated. As such, the cost of handling updates depends on
the number of views that have been generated for a pro-
tected resource, and the number of documents that must be
modified within each view.
Let us consider, for instance, the dataset of emails
introduced in Example 1, and let us suppose that the col-
lected emails are stored within a collection cl. The14 from is a sub-field of the email header.
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authorized view of cl is derived by considering all access
control policies specified for cl documents and related
fields. Several different views could be defined for the
same dataset, which differ for the number of documents
characterizing the protected collection, and the number of
fields that characterize any generated image of cl docu-
ments. In addition, every time a document of cl is updated,
it is also necessary to update the corresponding document
of each derived view.
On the basis of the above-mentioned considerations, we
believe that the view-based naive approach can only work
with small datasets, in scenarios with a low number of
stakeholders, which are inherently static.
A second type of enforcement mechanism is based on
query rewriting. To the best of our knowledge, in the lit-
erature on RDBMSs, two different approaches have been
proposed, which operate at row and cell level, respectively.
The first one, implemented by Oracle VPD, operates by
modifying the where clause of a submitted query q through
the conjunction of the selection criteria of q with policy
compliance predicates. This solution does not require any
serialization, as in practice the rewritten query generates an
authorized view at query execution time restricting the
selection criteria of the original query. Oracle VPD oper-
ates at row level, and thus in the NoSQL counter part, it
can only work at document level.
The second mechanism, introduced by Lefevre et al.
[17], operates at cell level, either projecting or nullifying
the value of each cell. The rewritten query is defined in
such a way to include a subquery for each accessed table t,
which substitutes the content of t with an authorized view
of this resource, generated starting from the cell level
access control policies. However, the schema of the
accessed tables must be known in order to perform the
rewriting, and thus, it cannot be directly applied to docu-
ment-oriented datastores, as each document structure is
potentially different from the ones of all other documents
belonging to the same collection.
On the basis of the previous considerations, neither the
view based, nor the query rewriting approaches proposed
for RDBMSs can be directly applied with NoSQL docu-
ment-oriented datastores.
4 Enforcement Strategies
The enhancement of NoSQL datastores with FGAC
requires to identify proper engineering solutions for the
encoding of fine-grained access control policies, the defi-
nition of enforcement monitors and the monitors integra-
tion into a target NoSQL system. In the remainder of this
section, we discuss possible strategies to address the above-
mentioned open issues.
4.1 Policy Encoding
The first considered issue is related to the approach to be
used for the specification of FGAC policies. In the litera-
ture on relational DBMSs, several approaches have been
proposed. For instance, in [6], purpose-based policies
operating at different granularity levels are specified in
dedicated tables. We believe that within NoSQL datastores,
a similar specification approach can be used for access
control policies operating at the collection level. The
policies can be either coarse grained, thus implicitly reg-
ulating the access to the whole referred collection, or fine
grained, thus regulating the access to documents of the
referred collection which satisfy given selection criteria.
However, we believe that FGAC policies should not be
specified within dedicated collections, as, currently, join
operations are not systematically supported by NoSQL
datastores. In contrast, they can be stored within dedicated
fields of the protected documents. In our previous work, we
have used this approach for document level [10] and field
level policies [12].
4.2 Enforcement
Abstracting from language and platform dependent
aspects, we believe that a promising strategy to enforce
FGAC within document-oriented NoSQL datastore con-
sists in combining query rewriting with in memory view
generation. Aware of the efficiency and consistency issues
that affect naive implementations of the view-based
approach (cfr. Sect. 3) and aligned with [17] principles,
we believe that an effective enforcement approach should
combine view generation and query rewriting, taking
maximum benefit from the two mechanisms. According to
the proposed approach, the views: (1) should not be
serialized on disk, but derived in memory at run time and
(2) should be directly generated by the rewritten queries,
on the basis of the execution environment of the access
request. More precisely, let q be a query that is submitted
for execution. At an high level of abstraction, the overall
goal of the approach consists in rewriting q as a query q0
which derives an authorized view cl0 of each collection cl
accessed by q and performs the same analysis tasks as q
accessing the derived views instead of the original col-
lections. Given a query q, the idea is to first derive the
selection criteria sc of q and the set of collections to be
accessed by q. For each collection cl accessed by q, the
criteria specified by sc as well as the access control
policies specified for cl are used to select candidate
documents of cl to be stored into cl0. Denoted with cl00,
the set of candidate documents, for each document d in
cl00, the approach prunes out from d any field f of d such
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that f is referred to by at least a policy p specified for d
fields, but no policy referring to f is satisfied.
At an high level of abstraction, the rationale of view
generation is aligned with the basic principles proposed in
[17], but the schemaless nature of the document-based
model requires a different rewriting mechanism as well as
a different view derivation approach. As pointed out in
Sect. 3, Lefevre et al. approach [17] requires to know in
advance the scheme of the accessed tables. This cannot
occur within the NoSQL scenario, where the structure of
each accessed document is potentially unique and thus
may differ from the ones of all other accessed documents.
For instance, within the email dataset previously consid-
ered, the emails can have a varying number of to/cc/bcc
receivers, whereas some of them may have no to/cc/bcc
receiver. The goal is thus carrying out the projection,
without knowing in advance the fields which characterize
the accessed documents. As such, a possible solution is the
one that operates by analyzing the structure of each doc-
ument at execution time and thus differs from the
methodology in [17], which relies on the a priori knowl-
edge of the accessed tables schema. The idea is to consider
the candidate documents as JSON objects, characterized
by properties representing the document fields. These
properties, which are modeled as key-value pairs, are
iteratively accessed and modified by means of JSON
manipulation functions. Different from [17], where the
attributes to be projected are referred to by name within
the rewritten queries, a possible approach for the NoSQL
scenario consists in referring to the fields to be projected
by position, iteratively considering any property of the
documents.
In order to exemplify the rationale of the proposed
approach and the differences with the one proposed for the
relational model, let us consider again the dataset of emails
referred to in Example 1 and the followings. Let us con-
sider a query q that derives all types of receivers and the
body of the emails that specify a given object. For the sake
of simplicity and the lack of a standard query language for
NoSQL databases, let us consider the SQL representation
of q, which can be straightforwardly defined as select to,
cc, bcc, body from emails where object like ‘‘party’’.
Let us now consider how q can be rewritten on the basis
of Lefevre et al. approach [17] within a RDBMS. For the
sake of simplicity, let us assume that the scheme of an
email is characterized by the fields from, to, cc, bcc, obj
and body, and let us suppose that the access to any email
field is regulated by a policy specified within field p. Let us
suppose the existence of a function compliesWith that
evaluates whether q execution complies with the access
control policies specified for each email field. Listing 1
shows the pseudocode of the rewritten SQL query that
derives the authorized view on email.
According to Listing 1, the outer query accesses the
view generated by the subquery, whereas the subquery
projects email fields, provided that the access control
policies specified for those fields are satisfied. As shown in
Listing 1, any field of emails is explicitly referred to by
name in the subquery.
Let us now consider a possible approach for the NoSQL
scenario. Listing 2 shows the SQL-like pseudocode of the
rewritten query.
Similar to Listing 1, the derivation of the authorized
view is achieved by a subquery, whereas the outer query
simply projects fields of the derived view. In this case, the
subquery generates an authorized image of each email
using JSON manipulation operators. In the pseudo code,
we have used the N1QL operator object,15 which allows
building an object by composition of key-value pairs of
another object, which satisfies a condition. The authorized
email images are thus defined in such a way to include any
field of the original email e for which the specified access
control policies are satisfied. In this case, we do not need to
explicitly refer to the fields to be projected by name, and
thus, it is not required to know in advance the fields
composing the documents.
15 For the sake of simplicity, Listing 2 reports a simplified syntax.
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4.3 Monitor Implementation and Integration
The heterogeneity and variety of existing NoSQL datas-
tores represent one of the main obstacles to the definition of
a general development and integration approach. NoSQL
document-oriented datastores typically provide APIs, often
available for different programming languages, which
support the programmatic interaction with the analysis and
management features. Each set of APIs is a different
interface to the provided services, and the enforcement
monitor should be defined in such a way to regulate the
fruition of these services, regardless they are invoked
trough the APIs or by means of queries expressed with the
supported data analysis languages. Although a possible
integration strategy consists in the programmatic modifi-
cation of the provided services, we believe that this cannot
be a general and portable solution, as it strictly depends on
the technological and architectural characteristics of each
datastore, as well as on the availability of the source code,
while the definition of a general solution requires to
abstract from these aspects.
Due to the client–server nature of NoSQL systems, a
possible way to handle the interaction with the datastore
services is to define the enforcement monitor as a proxy.
More precisely, the monitor should be responsible of the
interaction of the datastore clients with the target server,
exposing services to the clients and executing additional
checks whenever a service is invoked.
Within several NoSQL datastores, the client–server
interaction is achieved by means of dedicated, ad hoc
defined, communication protocols, which regulate the
information exchanged by the counterparts and the related
format. Each message either encodes a client request or a
server response to a client request. Client requests encode
the invocation of analysis or management services provided
by the server, whereas server responses encode the data that
are returned by the server. Whenever a user invokes the
execution of a service, either through an application or by
means of a graphical interface, the request is first encoded
and then sent to the server. Similarly, whenever the server
completes the computation of a command, it encodes the
response as a message sending it to the connected clients. In
order to specify a client for a specific programming lan-
guage, it is thus sufficient to implement an interpreter of the
considered communication protocol, which is capable of
encoding service invocations as messages. This suggests
that, in order to enforce FGAC, one could focus on the
messages exchanged by the clients and the server, rather
than focusing on syntactical aspects of the query languages.
The proxy should thus be defined as an interpreter of the
communication protocol supported by the considered data-
store. This solution has the advantage of ensuring indepen-
dence from APIs and programming languages, which are
typically subject of continuous changes. In contrast, com-
munication protocols are expected to be enhanced, to guar-
antee the interoperability of multiple client–server versions.
5 An Application Scenario: Enhancing MongoDB
with FGAC
In this section, we discuss a possible implementation of the
strategies proposed in Sect. 4 for MongoDB. A thorough
presentation of technical aspects related to design, imple-
mentation, and integration of the proposed enforcement
monitor can be found in [10, 12], which also provides a
thorough discussion related to the efficiency and scalability
of the proposed framework. In this section, we summarize
relevant aspects related to policy specification and the
developed enforcement mechanism.
5.1 Policy Specification
On the basis of the experience illustrated in [10], hereafter
we describe a possible implementation of purpose-based
access control policies, which are one of the most relevant
type of FGAC policies. In this scenario, a policy p is a pair
hr, ei, where r specifies the list of resources for which p has
been specified and e is the list of purposes for which the
access to the protected resources is authorized, which are
selected from a purpose set Ps. Access to a resource
referred to within r is granted, if the access purpose ap
associated with the access request complies with the pur-
poses specified within component e of p. Coarse-grained
policies regulating the access to collections of a database
db have been specified within a dedicated collection cgp. In
contrast, FGAC policies at document and field level have
been directly specified within the protected documents.
Example 4 Let us consider the email dataset introduced
in Example 1, and let us suppose that the considered
dataset collects all the emails in collection cl. Let us now
suppose that three purposed-based access control policies
have been specified, which, respectively, grant: (1) the
access to the collection of emails cl for marketing pur-
poses; (2) the access to email em of cl for analysis pur-
poses; and (3) the access to the list of receivers of em for
research purposes. The first policy is specified as h{cl},
{marketing}i and encoded as a document of collection cgp,
whereas the second and third policies are directly specified
within a dedicated field of em.
5.2 Enforcement Strategies
The enforcement mechanisms for the considered scenario
have been defined on the basis of the strategies introduced
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in Sect. 4. For space limitation, in this paper, we shortly
discuss selected aspects related to the enforcement mech-
anism abstracting from model specific aspects as well as
aspects related to authorization and compliance analysis
within the purpose-based access control model.
The process, illustrated in Fig. 1, starts considering the
query q which is submitted for execution and deriving the
collection cl that is accessed by q. Afterwords, the process
extracts from cgp all the access control policies that have
been specified for cl. Then, the compliance of the access
purpose of q with the purposes specified within the policies
specified for cl is checked. If purpose compliance is satisfied
for at least one policy, the process continues, otherwise it is
immediately blocked due to the missing authorizations.
The process goes on considering FGAC policies speci-
fied for the documents to be accessed by q. Due to limi-
tations of the supported query language, the mechanism is
differentiated on the basis of the type of operation encoded
by q. In particular, we focus here on aggregate and map-
reduce operations, which represent the most advanced
analysis operations of MongoDB. As introduced in Sect. 4,
the enforcement mechanisms should derive an authorized
view cl’ of the collection accessed by q, and rewrite q as q’
in such a way that q’ executes the analysis specified by q on
cl’. Two different rewriting approaches have been used for
the considered operations, as MongoDB adopts a propri-
etary notation for aggregate queries, and Javascript for
map-reduce queries. Abstracting from query language
specific aspects which require a technical background on
MongoDB, the main differences between the proposed
approaches are related to the generation of the authorized
view. In the case of map-reduce queries, the view is gen-
erated using the approach introduced in Sect. 4 and
exemplified in Listing 2. However, different from Listing
2, where SQL-pseudocode is used, map-reduce queries are
defined using Javascript functions. Listing 3 presents an
example of a map-reduce query mrq, which counts the
emails sent to addresses which have received at least one
email.
The authorized view is derived by means of Javascript
instructionswhich precede those performing the analysis and
aggregation. Referring to the example in Listing 3, the query
is rewritten in such away that the first instructions of function
map derive the authorized view of the mapped document.
This is achieved by analyzing all field level policies regu-
lating the access to the document, which according to the
strategy proposed in Sect. 4, are referred to within a dedi-
cated field. Given a document d, for each analyzed policy p
specified for d fields, if the policy predicate of p is not sat-
isfied, the fields referred by p are pruned out from d.
Fig. 1 Enforcement of FGAC within MongoDB
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In contrast, limitations of MongoDB query language do
not allow defining aggregate queries performing the
derivation of the authorized view at the head of the oper-
ations pipeline. In this case, it is not possible to apply the
approach introduced in Sect. 4, and the naive view gener-
ation approach comprising the serialization appears as the
only viable solution. As such, this case is handled with the
generation and sequential execution of two queries, which
generate and serialize the view to a temporary collection
and execute q processing activities on such a temporary
collection.
Example 5 Let us consider an aggregate query agq, which
counts the emails sent to given addresses, whose source
code is shown in Listing 4.
In this case, the rewriting is operated through the
sequential execution of two queries: 1) a map-reduce query
which derives an authorized view of the accessed collec-
tion on the basis of the policy compliance, as introduced
for the example related to Listing 3; and 2) an aggregate
query almost equivalent to agq.
5.3 Implementation
Let us briefly consider selected aspects related to the
development of the enforcement monitor. According to the
guidelines proposed in Sect. 4, the monitor has been
defined as a proxy which analyzes the interaction of
MongoDB clients and server. MongoDB client/server
interaction is achieved by means of the Wire16 communi-
cation protocol, which supports a request–response inter-
action initiated by the clients. The proposed monitor, which
has been designed as an interpreter of the Wire protocol,
analyzes all the requests that are issued by the clients to the
server, rewrites the query execution requests in accordance
with the previously discussed enforcement criteria, and
executes complementary functionalities in support of
access control enforcement, such as deriving access control
policies applied to a resource, evaluating purpose compli-
ance, handling the profiling of the users that issue query
execution requests. The monitor has been developed as a
Java multi-thread application deployed on a node which is
at the interface of the network that hosts the MongoDB
cluster.
We have extensively tested the developed monitor using
both synthetic datasets and a real dataset, that is, the Enron
corpus, a dataset of email messages comprising over 500K
emails (1.5 GB of data) exchanged by around 150
employees of the Enron corporation [15]. The experiments
targeting the synthetic datasets have considered a bench-
mark of 20 find, aggregate and map-reduce queries, which
have been defined in such a way to ensure different com-
plexity and selectivity levels.17 Similarly, the benchmark
targeting the Enron dataset includes 9 queries of type find,
aggregate and map-reduce which have been inspired by the
analysis functions presented in [21].
For our experiments, we have synthetically defined
FGAC policies in such a way that these provide given
selectivity levels. The experiments have assessed the
enforcement overhead for the considered queries varying
the selectivity of the considered policies. The results have
shown that overall the overhead decreases with the increase
in policy selectivity, due to the reduction of data that are
accessed and analyzed by the queries. The experiments
have shown that the overhead is negligible for find and
map-reduce queries, but it is significant for aggregate
queries. This confirms that the naive implementation of the
view-based approach (cfr Sect. 3), which appears as the
only viable solution for aggregate queries, suffers from low
efficiency. The interested readers can refer to [10, 12] for a
detailed presentation of the empirical results.
The experiences described in [10, 12] show significant
differences between the measured overhead for document
and field level access control policies. The overhead intro-
duced with document level access control policies is low.
Due to the effect of policy selectivity18 with several queries
of the considered benchmark, the execution time of the
rewritten version of the queries is even lower than the exe-
cution time of the original queries. In contrast, the experience
with field level access control policies reveals that the
enforcement overhead varies with the type of the considered
query. More precisely, aggregate queries suffer from a sig-
nificant time overhead, whereas the overhead that has been
measured with map-reduce queries is reasonably low.
16 https://docs.mongodb.com/manual/reference/mongodb-wire-proto
col/.
17 By policy selectivity we mean the percentage of fields which are
pruned out from the documents due to policy specification.
18 We mean the effect of policy enforcement which brings to reduce
the number of documents that are actually accessed.
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6 Conclusions and Future Work
NoSQL datastores are getting increasing interest by users
for their outstanding levels of flexibility, scalability, and
performance, and their ability to manage huge data vol-
umes. Despite this popularity, NoSQL datastores suffer
from inappropriate data protection features. We believe
that these shortcoming can be significantly addressed with
the integration of FGAC features into the datastores. The
integration of FGAC into a NoSQL datastore is a novel
research topic that has been only recently addressed and
that can open new research areas and applications. In this
paper, we have discussed issues and challanges arising
from the integration of FGAC features into NoSQL data-
stores. We have also described our experience with the
MongoDB NoSQL datastore.
Our research is still progressing. In particular, we are
currently focusing on recent standardization effort for
NoSQL datastores, such as for instance SQL?? [19], a
query language defined with the goal to become the ref-
erence query language for NoSQL datastores. SQL?? has
been designed to keep compliance with SQL syntax, so that
data analysts with a background on relational databases can
easily migrate to a NoSQL datastore with a small initial
effort. SQL?? is currently supported by AsterixDB19 [2]
and a few other datastores. A proprietary partial imple-
mentation of SQL??, denoted N1QL, is currently sup-
ported by the last version of Couchbase.20 We believe that
the involvement of industrial partners like Couchbase
shows a concrete commercial interest in such a unifying
solution. The availability of a general query language is an
interesting basis for the specification of platform indepen-
dent FGAC enforcement mechanisms, as well as for the
development of multi-platform enforcement monitors.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Competing of interest The authors declares that they have no
competing of interests.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://crea
tivecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
References
1. Agrawal R, Bird P, Grandison T, Kiernan J, Logan S, Rjaibi W
(2005) Extending relational database systems to automatically
enforce privacy policies. In: Proceedings of the 21st IEEE
international conference on data engineering (IEEE ICDE)
2. Alsubaiee S, Altowim Y, Altwaijry H, Behm A, Borkar VR, Bu Y
(2014) Asterixdb: a scalable, open source BDMS, PVLDB ’14,
pp 841–852
3. Bahri L, Carminati B, Ferrari E, Lucia W (2016) LAMP Label-
based access control for more privacy in online social networks.
In: Proceedings of the 10th WISTP international conference on
information security theory and practice (WISTP 2016)
4. Browder K, Davidson MA (2002) The virtual private database in
oracle9ir2. Oracle corporation, technical report 2002, oracle
technical white paper
5. Buccafurri F, Lax G, Nicolazzo S, Nocera A (2016) A middle-
ware to allow fine-grained access control of twitter applications.
In: Proceedings of the international conference on mobile, secure
and programmable networking (MSPN’2016)
6. Byun J, Li N (2008) Purpose based access control for privacy
protection in relational database systems. VLDB J 17(4):603–619
7. Cattell R (2011) Scalable SQL and NoSQL data stores. SIGMOD
Rec 39(4):12–27
8. Colombo P, Ferrari E (2014) Enforcement of purpose based
access control within relational database management systems.
IEEE Trans Knowl Data Eng (TKDE) 26(11):2703–2716
9. Colombo P, Ferrari E (2015) Efficient enforcement of action-
aware purpose-based access control within relational database
management systems. IEEE Trans Knowl Data Eng
27(8):2134–2147
10. Colombo P, Ferrari E (2015) Enhancing MongoDB with purpose
based access control. In: IEEE transactions on dependable and
secure computing (in press)
11. Colombo P, Ferrari E (2015) Privacy aware access control for big
data: a research roadmap. Big Data Res 2(4):145–154. ISSN
2214-5796, Elsevier
12. Colombo P, Ferrari E (2016) Towards virtual private NoSQL
datastores. In: 2016 IEEE 32nd international conference on data
engineering (ICDE), Helsinki, Finland, pp 193–204
13. Jahid S, Mittal P, Borisov N (2011) EASiER: encryption-based
access control in social networks with efficient revocation. In:
Proceedings of the 6th ACM symposium on information, com-
puter and communications security (ACM ASIACCS 2011)
14. Jin X, Wang L, Luo T, Du W (2013) Fine-grained access control
for HTML5-based mobile applications in android. In: Proceed-
ings of the 16th information security conference (ISC)
15. Klimt B, Yang Y (2004) The enron corpus: a new dataset for
email classification research. In: Machine learning: ECML 2004.
Springer, pp. 217–226
16. Kulkarni D (2013) A fine-grained access control model for key-
value systems. In: Proceedings of the third ACM conference on
data and application security and privacy, pp 161–164. ACM
17. LeFevre K, Agrawal R, Ercegovac V, Ramakrishnan R, Xu Y,
DeWitt D (2004) Limiting disclosure in hippocratic databases. In:
Mario A, Nascimento M, Tamer Z, Donald K, Rene JM, Jos A,
Blakeley B, Schiefer K (eds) Proceedings of the thirtieth inter-
national conference on very large data bases (VLDB ’04), vol 30.
VLDB Endowment, pp 108–119
18. Okman L, Gal-Oz N, Gonen Y, Gudes E, Abramov J (2011)
Security issues in NoSQL databases. In IEEE TrustCom
19. Ong KW, Papakonstantinou Y, Vernoux R (2014) The SQL??
unifying semi-structured query language, and an expressiveness
benchmark of SQL-on-Hadoop, NoSQL and NewSQL databases.
CoRR, abs/1405.3631
20. Rizvi S, Mendelzon A, Sudarshan S, Roy P (2004) Extending
query rewriting techniques for fine-grained access control. In:
Proceedings of the 2004 ACM SIGMOD international conference




Fine-Grained Access Control Within NoSQL Document-Oriented Datastores 137
123
21. Russell MA (2013) Mining the social web: data mining Face-
book, Twitter, LinkedIn, Google?, GitHub, and More. OReilly
Media, Inc
22. Ulusoy H, Colombo P, Ferrari E, Kantarcioglu M, Pattuk E
(2015) GuardMR: fine-grained security policy enforcement for
MapRe- duce systems. In: ACM ASIACCS
138 P. Colombo, E. Ferrari
123
